This paper focuses on fraud detection in surveys using Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data as an example for testing newly methods proposed here. A statistical theorem referred to as Benford's Law states that in many sets of numerical data, the significant digits are not uniformly distributed, as one might expect, but adhere to a certain logarithmic probability function. In order to detect fraud, we derive several requirements that should, according to this law, be fulfilled in the case of survey data. We show that in several SOEP subsamples, Benford's Law holds for the available continuous data. For this analysis, we developed a measure that reflects the plausibility of the digit distribution in interviewer clusters. We are thus able to demonstrate that several interviews that were known to have been fabricated and therefore deleted in the original user data set can now be detected using this method. Furthermore, in one subsample, we use this method to identify a case of an interviewer falsifying ten interviews not previously detected by the fieldwork organization.
Introduction
In any survey in which the data are collected by personal interviews, there is a risk that interviewers may cheat, or that some may fabricate data. We are able to distinguish between several forms of cheating. Firstly, the most blatant form is when an interviewer fabricates all 'responses' in an entire questionnaire. The US Bureau of the Census refers to this practice as 'falsification' or 'fabrication'. Sometimes this practice is also unofficially called 'curbstoning', thus named because a census taker "stands at the curb" and guesses the number of residents in a building or house without ever entering. Interviewers who do this are called curbstoners 1 (Moore/Marquis 1996) .
Secondly, a more subtle form is when an interviewer asks some questions in an interview and fabricates the responses to others.
A third form of cheating is when an interviewer knowingly deviates from prescribed interviewing procedures, such as conducting an interview with someone who is easily reachable and willing to participate instead of the person who is supposed to be interviewed.
Falsification might also include the acceptance of proxy information when self-response is required and the unauthorized use of the telephone when a personal visit is required.
This paper deals only with the first form of cheating: the fabrication of an entire interview. It focuses on fabricated data in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and an unconventional benchmark called Benford's Law is applied, which has already been used by several accountants to uncover fraud. Benford's Law is now also being used by several researchers in the social sciences to detect fabricated survey data (Diekmann 2002; Swanson et al. 2003; Schrä pler 2004; Schä fer et al. 2005; Bredl et al. 2008 ) and frauds in regression coefficients in economics and the social sciences (Tö dter 2009; Diekmann 2007) . In the present paper, we attempt to give some explanatory notes for this logistic distribution and explore the effectiveness of this procedure when applied to survey data.
Previous results regarding cheating behavior
In comparison with other methodological topics, the literature contains only a few studies dealing with cheating by interviewers. Crespi (1945) described several factors that may contribute to cheating behavior. He distinguished between factors relating to questionnaire characteristics (design and length, difficult and antagonistic questions), administrative demoralizers (inadequate interviewer remuneration and training), as well as external factors (bad weather, bad neighborhoods, etc.). He proposed a dual strategy of eliminating demoralizers and using a verification method to deter cheating. Some more recent studies have referred to these verification methods and dealt with optimal designs of quality control samples to detect interviewer cheating (Biemer/Stokes 1989) and evaluated quality control procedures for interviewers (Stokes/Jones 1989) .
Because of the lack of factual information concerning the nature of interviewer falsification, in 1982 the US Census Bureau implemented an "Interviewer Falsification Study" (Schreiner et al. 1988) . In this study, data were compiled from fifteen surveys conducted by twelve US Census Bureau regional offices over a five-year period. They found 205 cases of confirmed falsification. Most of these (74 %) were detected through re-interviews, and the majority (79 %) were determined to have been fabricated interviews. Their results provide evidence that the shorter the length of service, the more likely an interviewer is to falsify data (Schreiner et al. 1988) . Furthermore, when new interviewers falsify data, they usually do so for a relatively high proportion of their assignments, and they tend to fabricate entire interviews. Interviewers with five or more years of experience usually falsify a smaller proportion of their assignments and tend to classify eligible units as ineligible (Hood/Bushery 1997) .
Other studies have dealt with the 'quality' of faked interviews and the impact of fabricated data on substantive analysis. Reuband (1990) showed that students are able to reproduce data in fictive interviews using available demographic variables on real respondents. Schnell (1991) performed a study in which he substituted 220 real interviews from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS 1988, N = 3,052) with fictive interviews fabricated by sociology students and their fellow students at the same university. He analyzed the quality of the fabricated data and the robustness of substantive empirical results by comparing the German General Social Survey with the substituted false data. His main result was that univariate statistics like proportions, means, and variances are relatively robust against typical amounts of fabricated data in surveys (less than 5 %). Nevertheless, he also found some minor effects on multivariate statistics such as multiple regressions. Moreover, using simulations, he showed that higher proportions of fabricated data in surveys have a serious impact on multivariate statistics and data quality.
In the ALLBUS 1994, the ADM design was replaced with a new sampling design that provides the opportunity to systematically check that interviews (N = 3,505) have been conducted properly. The interviewers were given the names and addresses of the respondents directly. In six percent of the cases, irregularities were detected; half of them were falsified by the interviewers (Koch 1995) . These fabricated data (n = 45) were found after the routine monitoring by the data collection institute via the postcard method, which detected fifteen falsified interviews in this survey. Another finding was that interviewers who cheat are mainly younger people with higher levels of education (Abitur) and with a relatively high workload (number of interviews). The SOEP is aware of the interviewer characteristics of those who had cheated and was therefore able to compare them with the characteristics found in the ALLBUS (see Schrä pler . A rare debacle caused by falsified interviews is referred to by Diekmann (2002) . In the German city of Rostock, a traffic study about drivers was carried out by means of 600 face-to-face interviews. Eighty cases were later re-contacted for another study, which showed that sixteen of the former interviews were completely or partly fabricated by the interviewer. If we extrapolate this to the whole sample, that amounts to a share of 20 % fakes.
Benford's law
Besides the 'conventional' tests for stability and consistency, an unconventional benchmark by the name of Benford's Law has recently been used by several accountants to detect frauds. Social researchers have also proposed using this method for survey data (Diekmann 2002) . In this and the following section, we will test whether Benford's Law can be used as an instrument for quality control and fraud detection in surveys.
Benford's Law is an empirical 'law' which states that in many tables of numerical data, the significant digits are not uniformly distributed, as one might expect, but adhere to a certain logarithmic probability distribution (Hill 1996b) . According to Hill (1999) , in 1881, the astronomer Newcomb (Newcomb 1881) explained that his discovery of the significant digit law was sparked by an observation that the pages of a book of logarithms were dirtiest at the beginning and progressively cleaner throughout. Nevertheless, the law is named after Dr. Frank Benford, a physicist who made the same observation in 1938, when he embarked on a mathematical analysis of 20,229 sets of numbers, including such wildly disparate categories as the areas of rivers, baseball statistics, numbers in magazine articles and street addresses (see Benford 1938 , Schrä pler 2010 . He found that all these seemingly unrelated sets of numbers followed the same first digit probability pattern. In most cases, the number 1 turned up as the first digit about 30 percent of the time, more often than any other. Benford derived a formula to predict the frequency of numbers found in many categories of statistics. The leading significant (non-zero) digit obeys the law
Hence, a number chosen at random has leading significant digit d ¼ 1 with probability 0.301, a leading digit d ¼ 2 with probability 0.176 and so on, monotonically down to probability 0.046 for leading digit d ¼ 9. The general law for second and higher significant digits and their joint distribution is (Hill 1996a (Hill , 1999 :
where d 1 2 f1; 2; :::; 9g and d j 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; 9g; j ¼ 2; :::; k. Therefore, the joint probability
From equation 1 it follows that the significant digits are dependent and not independent. It can easily be seen that the joint probability that the second digit is 3, given that the first digit is 1, is
This interdependence among significant digits decreases rapidly as the distances between the digits increases (c. f. Hill 1995, 355) .
For many years, this law was considered little more than a numerical curiosity, but practical implications began to emerge in the 1960s (Scott/Fasli 2001) . It was later recognized that the suggestion that almost 1/3 of the numbers processed began with the digit '1' could have implications for the design of efficient computers (Hamming 1970; Knuth 1981) . In recent years, Benford's Law has been used successfully to detect fraudulent financial data (Nigrini 1999) .
Despite this rather slender empirical support (Scott/Fasli 2001) , there is disagreement about whether this law is a necessary mathematical truth or a contingent property of nature.
3.1 Explanations of Benford's law
Scale invariant theorem
The literature contains several theoretical papers that have attempted to explain why Benford's Law is true. The first step towards explaining this relationship was taken in 1961 by the mathematician Roger Pinkham (Pinkham 1961) . He argued that if there is a law of digit frequencies, it should be universal and 'scale-invariant.' This means that if we multiply all our numbers by an arbitrary constant, then the distribution of first digit frequencies should remain unchanged. Pinkham provided the proof that if a law of digit frequencies is invariant under changes of scale (e. g., dollars to euros), then it has to be Benford's Law. Furthermore, Hill (1995) was able to show that scale invariance implies base invariance, but not conversely. 2 Nevertheless, this explanation makes no contribu-tion to answering the question as to whether real data should conform to the logarithmic law.
Multiplying many numbers together
Another approach is based on the notion of producing a number by multiplying many numbers together. 3 Boyle (1994) showed that the logarithmic distribution is the limiting distribution of leading digits when random variables are repeatedly multiplied, divided, or raised to integer powers. Scott and Fasli (2001) were able to show in their simulations that there is indeed convergence towards the logarithmic distribution in all checked cases, and that for some distributions this convergence is rapid. 3.1.3 The Random-samples-from-random-distribution theorem by Hill (1995) A plausible theoretical explanation for the appearance of this logarithmic distribution is the random-samples-from-random-distribution theorem by the mathematician Hill (1995) . He showed "that if probability distributions are selected at random, and random samples are then taken from each of these distributions in any way so that the overall process is scale (or base) neutral, then the significant digit frequency of the combined sample will converge to the logarithmic distribution." (Hill 1995: 360) . If Hill's theorem is correct, this means that the digits derived from a random mix of different sources, from census data to stock market prices, should follow Benford's Law. The mixture of data may be the key. It is not a requirement that the individual realizations of a random variable have to be scale or base invariant. However, it is essential that the sampling process on average does not favor one scale over another (Hill 1995: 361) . This theorem may be important in helping us to answer the question as to whether it is feasible to apply Benford's Law to survey data as these contain different variables with different distributions.
Empirical evidence
There is evidence that many classes of true data sets follow Benford's Law. It has been found to apply to many sets of financial data, including income tax and stock exchange data, corporate disbursements and sales figures, demographic and scientific data (e. g., Nigrini 1999), as well as numbers gleaned from newspaper articles (Benford 1938; Hill 1999) . In the case of non-random sequences, Luque and Lacasa (2009) showed that Benford's Law describes with astonishing precision the statistical distribution of leading digits in the prime number sequence. Stock prices may seem to be a single distribution but their value actually stems from many measurements (salaries, the cost of raw material and labor), and so it is expected that they will follow Benford's Law in the long run. A recent study on whether tax returns in Germany follow Benford's Law showed that not all but the majority do conform to the logarithmic distribution 5 (Posch 2003) .
3 This approach is appealing because of its similarity to the Central Limit Theorem. The notion that Benford's Law might embody a similar general rule for the production of a number of random variables is very attractive (Scott/Fasli 2001: 4) . 4 They showed that two factors influence the rate of convergence: the variance of the mantissa of the random variate and the deviation of the random variate's distribution from Benford's Law. 5 Posch (2003) (Nigrini 1999) . Assigned numbers, such as social security numbers or bank accounts, will not conform to it. Furthermore, deviations from the law's prediction can be caused by merely rounding numbers up and down. Moreover, the sample of numbers should be large enough to give the predicted proportions a chance to assert themselves (Pinkham 1961) , and the sets of numbers should essentially be subsets of a larger series and not just huge chunks of that series. Recently, Benford's Law has been used to determine the normal level of number duplication in data sets, which in turn makes it possible to identify abnormal digit and number occurrence. Accountants and auditors have begun to apply Benford's law to corporate accounting to discover number pattern anomalies and frauds.
Recent empirical explanations
The simulation results of Scott and Fasli (2001) Scott and Fasli (2001) pointed out that "the situation is thus such that, if it should turn out to be the case that Benford's Law is valid, then there are several alternative mathematical explanations of why this should be so. On the other hand, none of them imply that the logarithmic law is necessarily true." (Scott/Fasli 2001: 4) . In their experimental study, Scott and Fasli first attempted to find 'natural data sets' that conform to Benford's Law. They investigated 230 data sets, all of which can be accessed on the web. Overall, over half a million numbers were examined. They found that only 12.6 % (29 of 230) satisfied the 5 % significance criterion for conformity to Benford's Law. However, they found a significant number of real data sets that definitely do not conform to the law but have leading digit distributions that are broadly similar. In particular, leading digit frequency proved to be a monotonically decreasing function of digit value. In mathematically generated data sets they investigated recurrent products and products of random variates in a second step. 6 The main results are (Scott/Fasli 2001) :
* Multiplying the current number by a constant: in the majority of cases, the resulting distribution is very close to Benford's Law. Exceptions arise when the multiplier is an exact integral power or root of 10 because multiplying by 10 does not change the leading digit. * Multiplying the current number by a uniformly distributed random variate: such sequences also converge to the logarithmic distribution except in cases where the mean is an integral power or root of 10 and the standard deviation is small. * Each number in the data set is the product of several random variables: the results show convergence towards the logarithmic distribution in all cases. Two factors influence the rate of convergence: the variance of the mantissa of the random variate and the deviation of the random variate's distribution from Benford's Law. 6 There have been several other simulation studies. Engel and Leuenberger (2003) showed in their study that exponentially distributed random numbers obey Benford's law approximatively, i. e., within bounds of 0.03. Miller and Nigrini (2008) explained why so many data sets follow Benford's Law (or at least a close approximation to it). They showed that if we can consider the observed values of a system to be the product of many independent processes with reasonable densities, then the distribution of the digits of the resulting product will come close to Benford's Law.
Benford's Law and the Lognormal Distribution These results support the theoretical models that are based on recurrent multiplication and on the assumption that each item is the product of several random variates. The latter is the equivalent to adding their logarithms. Because the sum of independent random variates tends to a normal distribution as the number increases (Central Limit Theorem), the logarithm of the product of random variates should also tend to a normal distribution. Therefore, there is a connection between Benford's Law and the lognormal distribution. Scott and Fasli showed that conformity to Benford's Law is a function of the shape parameter r and independent of scale parameter (median) because Benford's Law is scale invariant (Hill 1996a) . Very good fits appear if the shape parameters of the lognormal distributions exceed the value 1.2. Scott and Fasli concluded from this finding that when the distribution of data conforms to a lognormal distribution and their shape exceeds 1.2, this should give rise to leading digit distributions satisfying the logarithmic law. This is the case if: 1. the data set has only positive values, 2. the data set has a unimodal distribution where the modal is not zero and 3. the data set has a positively skewed distribution in which the median is no more than half of the mean.
The latter ensures that the shape parameter of the lognormal distribution will exceed 1.2. From their empirical results, Scott and Fasli drew their fundamental conclusion that "Benford's Law is not a necessary mathematical truth or a deep mystical property of our universe. It is a straightforward consequence of the way in which we quantify our observations of that universe. Measurements that cannot meaningfully take values less than zero give rise to Benford's Law. Not all of them do. If the range of measurement is such that zero falls well outside the range of practical consideration, then the leading digits will not conform to the law. But many of the quantities that we measure are necessarily positive and have ranges that include significant numbers of items close to zero. According to our explanation, it is these that give rise to Benford's Law." (Scott/Fasli 2001: 17) .
Therefore, on the basis of their simulation results, Scott and Fasli concluded that many real data sets conform to Benford's Law because their distribution follows a lognormal distribution with a shape greater than 1.2. They stated that a large number of naturally occurring quantities have these characteristics.
Using Benford's law on survey data?
An interesting point for survey researchers is whether this logarithmic distribution, Benford's Law, can also be used to identify fabricated data in surveys. Hence, the main question is whether survey data follow Benford's Law. Unlike financial data, many variables in these databases are dichotomous or categorical (such as gender, marital status and occupation) or are assigned numbers like household numbers. In this case, these data certainly do not conform to Benford's Law. However, there are often also variables which refer to other monetary or continuous values.
SOEP data and their conformity to Benford's law
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for our analysis. The SOEP is a longitudinal representative survey containing socio-economic information on private households in the Federal Republic of Germany (Wagner et al. 2007 All household members aged 16 and older are interviewed. We use the first waves of the samples A/B, C, E, and F for our analysis.
Requirements
The literature shows that the validity of Benford's Law depends on certain conditions. We attempt to summarize all necessary requirements that have to be fulfilled in order to detect fraudulent data in surveys with Benford. Some of these requirements are derived from simulation results (Scott/Fasli 2001) , while others are findings from practical applications (Nigrini 1999) or theoretical analyses (Hill 1995) . * The data set should not contain a built-in maximum because the frequency of these values will occur more often in the digit analysis and will cause biased results (Nigrini 1999) . * The data set should not contain assigned numbers such as social security numbers or bank accounts (Nigrini 1999) . * The data set should only have positive values with a unimodal distribution where the modal is not zero (Scott/Fasli 2001) . * The data set should have a positively skewed distribution in which the median is lower than the mean. Hence, the data set should contain more smaller than larger values. * The data set should not emanate from statistical procedures such as calculated means or variances that emanate from other data (Mochty 2002 ). * The usefulness for survey data depends on the existence of continuous variables in the data set. Survey data that only contains categorical data do not meet the aforementioned conditions. A further requirement is a large enough sample size of the data set. The larger the sample size, the better the fit to Benford's distribution should be, as long as all of the above requirements are satisfied.
Description of the data used for Benford's law
We restricted our analysis to variables with monetary values. Apart from monthly gross and net income, the data sets contain variables such as gross amount of Christmas or vacation bonus, gross amount of monthly unemployment benefits or monthly subsistence allowance, gross amount of early retirement benefits, amount of taxes, as well as many other monetary variables. The amount of monetary variables increases over the waves. The first two waves in the years 1984 and 1985 contain approximately twenty variables and this increases to over thirty in subsequent waves. Sample C starts in 1990 with over 40 monetary variables, and samples E and F contain about 60 variables in the year 2000. The selected monetary values are pooled over all variables for each selected wave. The distribution of these data sets is estimated by a kernel density estimation method with an Epanechnikov function. Figure 1 shows the estimated distributions for the first waves used from samples A/B, C, E, and F. They contain the number of variables in the data set, the number of values (N), the mean and the standard deviation, as well as the median. The distributions of the data sets of the following waves are shown in detail in Schrä pler (2010). We can see that -except for sample C, wave 1 -all distributions tend to have a similar shape: the distributions are unimodal and the medians are always lower than the means and yield positively skewed distributions. A unimodal positively skewed distribution is one important requirement for the use of Benford's Law (Scott/Fasli 2001) . The monetary data sets of sample C are unimodal but quite symmetric and not positively skewed, and the values for median and mean are quite close.
Wave-specific fit to Benford for several subsamples in SOEP
In the next step, we examine the overall goodness of fit for these datasets. The following Figures 2 to 5 show the first digit and the first two digit distributions of the selected data in the first eight waves of samples A and B. The 95 % confidence interval for the first digit distribution is calculated with (Nigrini 2000, 43) :
Figure 1 Kernel density estimation for the distribution of the selected monetary data sets of the first wave of subsamples A/B, C, E, and F in the SOEP (normal density function is dashed
where h b d is the expected proportion according to the logarithmic distribution and n indicates the sample size of all numbers analyzed. Unfortunately, the usefulness of these intervals is somewhat limited. Due to the fact that the sample size of the digits is larger than 20,000 in all waves, we obtain very close confidence intervals. Hence, even very small deviations from Benford's distribution are always statistically significant.
Overall Fit to Benford -the First Waves of Samples A/B, C, E, and F If we take a look at the first waves of the subsamples (Figures 2 -5), we find very similar distributions. At Nevertheless, on closer inspection, we can see that, in fact, the proportions of the first digits deviate significantly from the logarithmic distribution. All v 2 values indicate that the distributions do not follow Benford's distribution exactly. This is partly a result of the large sample size. In the case of N = 300, we would get no significant deviations (except for sample C). The distributions for the first two digits in Figure 2 show significantly higher proportions for numbers like 10; 20; 30; :::; 90. Of course, this finding is a result of the respondent's rounding behavior. Unlike many other collected data sets such as data from stock markets which contain relatively precise continuous monetary values, interview data are often rounded (cf. Schrä pler 1999). The respondents often have cognitive problems recalling their exact gross income or other income-related variables. Therefore, the given values in surveys are more or less rough estimates and rounded after the first or second significant digit. The distributions of the first two digits give some information about this rounding behavior. Also, the figures show that the shape of these distributions have one characteristic in common with Benford's distribution: the proportion of smaller digits is higher than the proportion of larger digits.
Obviously, in Figure 3 we can recognize different patterns in the distribution in wave 1 for the East German sample C (wave 7 for the SOEP). The data were collected in the year 1990 directly after German unification. In 1990 (wave 1), the living conditions and incomes of most East German residents were still quite similar. Hence, the interviewer works in a very homogeneous area. If the first digit distribution for each respondent always deviates in the same way from the logarithmic distribution within a particular cluster, we can expect an accumulation and a higher disproportion of certain digits. In sample C, wave 1, we find too many monetary values with a first digit '1' in the data set and also higher proportions than predicted for the digits '7', '8', and '9'. In Figure 1 on page 693 we can see for sample C that the distributions in this data set are symmetric, not positively skewed, and that the variances are very small. In the year 1990, the standard deviations are lower than the mean that result in variation coefficients (std:=mean) lower than one. All other data sets analyzed have variation coefficients higher than one. The majority of the monetary values lie between DM 500 and DM 2,000. Overall, this entails larger deviations from the logarithmic distribution. We therefore cannot expect that the use of Benford's Law will lead to satisfying results for sample C.
Identifying Interviewer clusters with unusual patterns in relation to Benford's law
In contrast to cross-sectional surveys, falsification is extremely difficult in complex longterm panel studies like the SOEP because the respondent is normally interviewed face to face every year, and regular consistency checks between waves immediately show any irregularities in the data. Hence, we can assume that fabricated data would generally be a problem only in the first wave of each sample (with the exception of the East German sample C and the small sample D, which are considered as 'clean')and would then be detected quite quickly. We therefore focus our analysis on the first, second, and third waves of several SOEP subsamples.
For testing the Benford Law procedures, we obtained (true) falsified records from the fieldwork organization that were previously detected using several conventional verification methods and statistical tests of stability and consistence (see Schrä pler/Wagner 2005). Only one interviewer was able to fabricate data for the first two waves without raising suspicion until wave 3 (sample E). The first waves of samples A and B only contain 0.6 and 1.5 % fabricated data, respectively, and the first wave of sample E contains about 2 % falsified household interviews. In the second wave, approximately 1 % of fabricated data was identified in sample E. Due to problems with interviewer cheating in sample E of SOEP, for sample F, all households (N ¼ 5; 848) were re-contacted after being interviewed and asked to verify the household composition. In the first wave of sample F, only 0. 
where n i is the number of first digits in the interviewer cluster i, h di is the observed proportion of digit d ¼ 1; :::; 9 in interviewer cluster i and h b d is the proportion of digit d under Benford's distribution. As already mentioned above, using Pearson's chi-square statistic has the disadvantage that the values depend partly on the number of observations. Consequently, we will obtain higher chi-square values for the same deviations if some interviewer clusters have more digits than others. This makes a comparison of clusters complicated. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a better test technique to ensure that all interviewer clusters can be compared. A better solution might be to calculate probabilities for the chi-square values based on a resampling method such as a bootstrap.
Plausibility values using a resampling method
The bootstrap is a computer-based method for assigning measures of accuracy to statistical estimates. Bootstrap samples are generated by resampling with replacement B times from the original data set. For instance, with n ¼ 6, we might obtain x Ã ¼ ðx 5 ; x 3 ; x 5 ; x 4 ; x 6 ; x 1 Þ. The bootstrap algorithm begins by generating from a large number B of independent bootstrap samples x Ã1 ; x Ã2 ; :::; x ÃB , each of size n.
Then we obtain bootstrap replicates by calculating the value of the statisticĥ Ã h Ã ðbÞ on each bootstrap sample x Ãb . Ifĥ h is the sample chi-square value to Benford, for instance, then h Ã h Ã ðbÞ is the chi-square value to Benford of the bootstrap sample b. More formally, the algorithm for the non-parametric bootstrap is as follows: 1. Sample n observations randomly with replacement from x obs to obtain a bootstrap data set, denoted X Ã . 2. Calculate the bootstrap version of the statistic of interest,ĥ Ã h Ã ¼ĥ hðX Ã Þ 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 a large number of times, say B, to obtain an estimate of the bootstrap distribution. In our specific case, the statistic of interest is the chi-square value of an interviewer cluster with size n. We intend to find the probability for the realized or more extreme chisquare value of an interviewer cluster with a certain size of n digits. A key question is how large B should be. Whereas for standard errors B ¼ 50 is often enough to give a good estimate of seðĥ hÞ, much bigger values of B are required for bootstrap confidence intervals (Efron/Tibshirani 1993: 52) . For 90-95 percent confidence intervals, Efron and Tibshirani (1993: 162) suggest that B should be 1,000 or more. As we intend to estimate probabilities, we decided that B should be at least 2,000.
Percentile Interval Method The Central Limit Theorem tells us that as n ! 1, the bootstrap histogram will become normal shaped, but for small samples it may look very abnormal. In this case, there is good reason to choose the percentile interval method. This method uses the percentiles of the bootstrap histogram to define confidence limits and significance tests. Again, we generate B independent bootstrap data sets x Ã1 ; x Ã2 ; :::; x ÃB for each interviewer cluster with size n (number of digits in the cluster) and compute (for the chi-square statistic) bootstrap replicationŝ h h Ã ðbÞ; b ¼ 1; 2; :::; B. is the 100 Á ð1 À aÞth empirical percentile (cf. Efron/Tibshirani 1993: 170) . Besides percentile intervals, an approximation of the probability of obtaining a value of test statistic (chi-square values) more extreme than that actually observed Probðh >ĥ hÞcan be obtained directly from the proportion of bootstrap replications higher than the original estimateĥ h
Using the percentile interval method, we can achieve probability values for the original chi-square values of the interviewer clusters that are independent of the size of the interviewer clusters. These probabilities reflect the plausibility of the fit to Benford, independent of the number of digits in the cluster.
Our hypothesis is that cheating interviewers will have very low probabilities. Hence, it might be useful to construct interviewer rankings by means of plausibility values.
Fit in interviewer clusters of sample A/B
The scatterplots in Figures 6 -7 show the fit to Benford for the first digit and first two digit distribution in each interviewer cluster in samples A/B. 8 The chi-square values of the clusters with detected fabricated interviews are marked with black circles. We can see that one of the four fabricated clusters has the worst fit to Benford and appears as an outlier in the case of the first digit distribution. In the first two digit distribution, three of the marked clusters have very high fit values.
Figures 8 and 9 on page 700 show the density distribution 9 of the probability PðpercÞ in samples A/B, wave 1 for the first digit and first two digit distribution (normal density dotted line). If all interviewers are free from suspicion, PðpercÞ would only have values above 0.5 and the density function would ideally have a peak around PðpercÞ ¼ 1:0. In our case, the highest density occurs at PðpercÞ ¼ 0:94. We can also see in the low probability region at PðpercÞ ¼ 0:1 a local maximum. This means that there are a number of clusters with very low plausible fit values. One reason might be that these interviewers work in quite homogeneous sample points and/or that some of these interviewers fabricate their assignment and fail Benford's Law. Table 1 on page 701 shows the interviewer ranking by the probability PðpercÞ of each cluster for waves 1 to 3, sample A/B. We can see that the fabricated cluster of the interviewer already identified as cheating, no. xx827x with 122 digits, has the lowest probability PðpercÞ ¼ 0:002 of all interviewers in wave 1. Overall, we find six additional interviewers who have probabilities below the 5 % level. Of course, this is not a sure indication that these clusters are fabricated but low plausibilities for the chi-square values realized could be the result of cheating and the fieldwork organization can use this information to re-contact households in suspicious interviewer clusters. Unfortunately, the other two fakes evident in wave 1 could not be identified with the first digit distribution. The cheating interviewer no. xx800x ranks 61 (P(perc) = 0.265) and interviewer no. xx937x even has a really high plausibility of 0.958 and rank 420 (not shown in the table). Nevertheless, if we use the first two digit Benford distribution, we will find three of four cheating interviewers in the top 12 of the ranking list, shown in Schrä pler (2010) . This indicates that, in some cases, the first two digit distribution is more successful. 
Fit in interviewer clusters of sample C
We have shown in Figure 3 on page 694 that Benford's Law doesn't hold in wave 1 in the East German sample C. We have found a strong disproportion of the lower digits, probably caused by homogeneous clusters with quite low monetary values. The homogeneity in the data is attributed to the living conditions in East Germany in the year 1989. If the overall fit in the sample is worst, we can reasonably assume that the fit for most clusters will be worst too. Leading on from this, in Figure 10 we find rather high chi- Figure 10 First digit distribution: chi-square values for interviewer cluster in sample C wave 1 Figure 11 First two digit distribution: chi-square values for interviewer cluster in sample C wave 1 square values for clusters in wave 1 of sample C (max. chi-sq. = 112.8; digits = 99). Despite all this, the fieldwork organization was unable to identify any cheating interviewers in this sample. Figures 12 and 13 show the density distribution of the probability PðpercÞ in sample C, wave 1 (normal density dotted line) for the first digit and first two digit distributions. The shape of the first digit density function is completely different from Figure 8 on page 700. We find the highest density around 0.1 and a local maximum at 0.65. A naive interpreta- Figure 12 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample C, wave 1, first digits Figure 13 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample C, wave 1, first two digits Source: SOEP, individual questionnaire, only monetary variables, 1989 -1991 (own calculation) tion would be that almost all interviewers are suspect. However, this density shape is, of course, caused by the homogeneity of the interviewer clusters in sample C in the first few years after German unification. The distribution of PðpercÞ for the first digit-fit statistic shows that the success of Benford's approach is highly dependent on the requirement that Benford's Law holds for the whole sample. 10 The density distribution for the first two digit-fit statistic in Figure 13 seems to be more suitable. The shape shows a local maximum around 0.1 and a maximum around 0.98. Table 2 on page 704 shows the interviewer ranking based on the plausibility of the fit for the first digit distribution for sample C. 11 We can see that in wave 1 approximately 80 interviewers have a value of PðpercÞ < 0:05.
Fit in interviewer clusters of sample E
The overall fit to Benford in sample E is shown in Figure 4 on page 695. Although the distribution does not follow Benford exactly, we could recognize that the shape is quite similar. We assume that we can use the logarithmic distribution to detect fabrications. Figures 14 -17 on pages 706 and 707 show the scatterplots of the chi-square values for each interviewer cluster. The falsified clusters marked are obviously outliers in the first digit distribution. Figure 18 on page 708 shows the density distribution of the probability PðpercÞ in sample E, wave 1 (normal density dotted line). Because sample E contains only 1,957 respondents (including fakes), we are able to use a good deal more bootstrap replications with B ¼ 10; 000 than in sample A/B (B ¼ 2; 000) without encountering computational problems. The shape of the density distribution is very similar to the distribution of sample A/B (Figure 8 on page 708) . We find the highest density near value 0.95 and a local maximum at value 0.15. Most clusters therefore have very plausible fits to the logarithmic distribution. The shape seems suitable for detecting fraudulent interviewers. Table 3 on page 709 shows the interviewer ranking for sample E. Fraudulent interviewers are framed and marked in bold. We find three of five cheating interviewers within the top 7. Furthermore, the interviewer who faked two waves is at the top of the list in wave 2. The two undetected cheating interviewers have only one (fabricated) personal interview each. We can assume that this cluster size is too small for our detection procedure. Their positions in the ranking list are therefore 118 and 69, respectively. However, overall, our empirical results show that Benford's approach is remarkably successful in the case of sample E. Figure 5 on page 695 suggests that Benford's Law approximately holds for the first wave of sample F. The falsified cluster that has already been detected by the fieldwork organization is marked in black in the scatterplots in Figures 20 and 21 . The number of different continuous and monetary variables in each data set is, at approximately 60, quite high. Because sample F contains 10,481 respondents (with falsifications) and more than triple the number of interviewer clusters (536) in sample E, we have to reduce the bootstrap replications to B ¼ 2; 000 to avoid computation problems. The density distribution of the probability PðpercÞ in wave 1 is shown in Figure 22 . The shape of this distribution 10 In section 5.7 on page 713, we introduce an alternative, more general procedure that does not assume that Benford's Law holds exactly for a particular data set. The only assumption is that the vast majority of interviewers are honest. This alternative should perform better in the case of sample C. 11 The ranking for the first two digit distribution is shown in Schräpler (2010).
Fit in interviewer clusters of sample F
is quite similar to the shape for samples A/B and E. The highest density is, again, close to the value 0.95 and we find a local maximum in the range of 0.15 to 0.4. Table 4 on page 709 shows the interviewer ranking for the plausibility of the first digit-fit statistic values in sample F. The cheating interviewer, who had already been detected, is framed and marked in bold. He is listed within the top ten in the wave 1 list. Figure 18 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample E, wave 1, first digits Figure 19 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample E, wave 1, first two digits Table 3 Interviewer ranking by plausibility of interviewer clusters in waves 1-3, sample E, (B ¼ 10; 000) Benford's Law as an Instrument for Fraud Detection in Surveys Using the Data . 709
Predictive power of Benford -a new falsifier is detected
The aim of the study is not only to show that the Benford distribution allows us to identify falsifications that have already been detected. We also intend to detect fabrications that have not yet been found using conventional quality control methods. Therefore, we now attempt to identify additional fabrications in the survey. To test the predictive power of Benford's Law, we consulted the fieldwork organization, Infratest, to check our inter- viewer ranking lists and match them with their own information. Because the data collections in samples A/B, C, and E were made over twelve years ago, we concentrate our inquiry on the newest subsample F. The first wave of sample F started in the year 2000. An investigation by Infratest produced an astonishing result: in our list, interviewer no. xx713x, who had been fired because of unreliability, is ranked above no. xx085x, who had been fired after wave 1 because of falsifying interviews. The results of our Benford Figure 22 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample F, wave 1, first digits Figure 23 Distribution of the probability PðpercÞ, sample F, wave 1, first two digits analysis suggested that interviewer no. xx713x fabricated his interviews as well. A close inspection subsequently conducted by Infratest showed that only two of his ten declared respondents actually exist and are reachable. Infratest and DIW Berlin have now labeled this interviewer to be a falsifier, as detected by our method. The data of this interviewer have been deleted from the SOEP.
5.7 Detecting unusual data rather than data not in conformity with Benford In the previous sections, we have assumed that Benford's Law holds completely for all our data sets. We have used Pearson's chi-square test statistic to determine whether an interviewer's data follow Benford's Law. Sometimes it may be useful to bear in mind the fact that Benford's Law may not hold completely for a particular data set. However, we can assume that the vast majority of interviewers are honest, meaning that the estimated value of h b d using the complete universe of data collected by all interviewers is close to the true value of h b d (cf. Swanson et al. 2003 ). An alternative test statistic is therefore a chi-square statistic where, instead of h b d , we use the proportion of all numbers collected in survey with the leading digit d, that is,
, which gives us the formula:
n i is the number of first digits in the interviewer cluster i ¼ 1; :::; k, h di is the observed proportion of digit d ¼ 1; :::; 9 in interviewer cluster i and n di is the number of digit d in cluster i. Table 5 on page 714 shows the interviewer ranking by plausibility of the obtained chisquare value based on equation 6. Again, the known fabricated clusters are framed and marked. We can see that for sample A/B, the first cheating interviewer is ranked at position 16 followed by the second at position 20. If we compare this ranking with the list in Table 1 on page 701, which is based on the assumption that the data set used follows Benford, we find no evidence that the modified test statistic yields better results. The first cheating interviewer is ranked at position 1 in the Benford ranking list and the next falsifier somewhat lower at rank 61. For sample E, the Benford assumption clearly yields better results. Table 3 on page 709 shows that three falsifiers can be found among the top seven, whereas in the list based on the modified test statistic in Table 5 only two cheating interviewers are in the top ten. The unusual pattern method ranks the detected fake at position no. 7 instead of no. 10 in the case of Benford in sample F. However, the new falsifier detected by Benford in sample F could not be identified using the unusual pattern method (no. 52).
Our results suggest that the calculation of both test statistics could be useful. If we assume that the first twenty interviewers in the ranking list can be classified as suspect, we get quite similar suspicious interviewer clusters. Furthermore, using this criterion, we find two falsifiers in sample A/B with the modified test statistic as opposed to only one with Benford. However, if we use two different test statistics and obtain two ranking lists, the question arises as to whether we have the same suspect interviewers at the top of our lists. We would expect a positive correlation of both rankings. Figure 24 shows Spearman's Table 5 Detecting unusual data in interviewer clusters in sample A/B, sample E, and sample F, wave 1 -ranking by plausibility Source: SOEP, sample A/B, sample E and sample F, individual questionnaire, only continuous variables (own calculation) correlation coefficient for the rankings based on Benford and the modified test statistic by the size of the sorted list. We can assume that the correlation differs depending on whether we use only the top twenty or the whole list. We sort the combined ranking lists both by Benford and by the ranks of the unusual data statistic. The graphs show particularly high correlations for interviewers at the top. For the top ten, we have values just under 1.0 (sample E, the figures for the other samples are shown in Schrä pler 2010).
The correlation swings into a value of 0.5 if we enlarge the number of clusters included, and then increases slightly with the number of clusters. This finding suggests in particular that the clusters with the worst plausibility in both lists are highly positively correlated. Both statistics therefore tend to classify the same interviewers as suspect.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper focuses on fabricated interviews in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the detection of these falsifications. A total of 90 falsified household interviews and 184 falsified individual interviews have been detected, almost all of them in the first wave of a subsample. The share of fabricated data is low in all samples and the maximum is 2.4 % in sample E. It is important to note that, apart from the fakes in sample E, falsified data have never been disseminated as part of the widely-used SOEP, since the fabrications were detected before the data were released. However, these falsifications are in the original data files -kept at DIW Berlin -and provide a rich source for methodological research.
First, we examined in detail whether Benford's Law holds in each interviewer cluster of samples A/B, C, E, and F. We find a solution to assess the plausibility of the chi-square values obtained that is independent of the cluster size. A resampling method such as the interval percentile method allows us to determine the probability PðpercÞ of obtaining a chi-square value more extreme than that actually observed. High probabilities can be interpreted as a high plausibility and vice versa.
Our results show that, in fact, the fabricated clusters in samples A/B, E, and F mostly have low probabilities and occur at the top of the interviewer ranking list for the first digit distribution. If we regard the first ten interviewers as suspicious, using Benford, we identify one of three falsifiers in sample A, three of five falsifiers in sample E wave 1, one out of one in wave 2, and also one of out one in sample F. This looks very impressive. But if we really assume that the first ten interviewers are suspicious, we will get very high alpha errors because we will be classifying many innocent interviewers as falsifiers.
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The undetected fabricated clusters in sample E are too small for our detection procedure. However, in sample A/B, we could not find two large fabricated clusters because the first digits of their continuous values tend to conform to the logarithmic distribution. 14 However, if we relax the assumption that Benford's Law holds in the whole data set and, instead, use a more general test statistic, we find an additional falsifier among the top twenty. This test statistic only makes the assumption that the vast majority of interviewers are honest.
Finally, an astonishing result is that, using Benford, we find a new fabricator who has never been detected previously by the fieldwork organization. The interviews from this cheating interviewer will be deleted in the upcoming waves of the SOEP. This success demonstrates the predictive power of our Benford method.
If we sum up all our results, we can conclude that this procedure cannot really detect frauds in surveys but it is useful to detect suspicious interviewers in surveys. For fieldwork organizations, it gives an indication where it is reasonable to re-contact respondents. In the SOEP, sample F, all respondents were re-contacted to control for frauds. This is time-consuming and expensive. In this case, a ranking list of suspicious interviewers is very helpful.
Also note that the means for missing values and household contacts are always lower in faked than in non-faked clusters in the SOEP (see Schrä pler 2010). Cheating interviewers consistently underestimate these variables. Unfortunately, we cannot use this information in our Benford analysis because missing values are indicated by assigned numbers (-1;-2;-3). However, an alternative method which we called the variability method can also take non-continuous variables into account. The variability method is an unsupervised learning method for outlier detection. It is based on the assumption that the varia- 13 For sample A/B, we will get an alpha error of a ¼ 14 We can, however, use alternatives: the examination of the plausibility for the first two digit-fit statistic yields low probabilities for all three falsified clusters.
bility across questionnaires in faked interviews is lower than expected, considering the whole survey. The success of this method is documented in Schä fer et al. (2005) . The results suggest using a combination of both procedures for detecting frauds in surveys.
